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LEVERAGING LITIGATION: ENFORCING 
SOVEREIGN DEBT OBLIGATIONS IN NML 
CAPITAL, LTD. v. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA 
EMMA KINGDON* 
Abstract: In the sovereign debt market, the typical remedies to resolve sovereign 
default are either the negotiation route or a unilateral exchange offer. However, 
as a result of increasing insecurity in the sovereign debt market due to rogue sov-
ereign debtors who take advantage of their immunity to opportunistically default 
and create unfavorable restructuring deals, creditors began resorting to a previ-
ously limited remedy: litigation. Although litigation to resolve sovereign default 
was not a new concept in the sovereign debt market, it was ineffective due to the 
creditor’s inability to actually recover the money judgment from the sovereign 
debtor. In NML Capital v. Argentina, the Second Circuit determined that the in-
junctive remedy was necessary to motivate sovereign debtors to meet the obliga-
tions to their creditors and to reduce the nonpayment risk in the sovereign debt 
market. By establishing an enforcement mechanism for a creditor against a sov-
ereign debtor, the Second Circuit increased certainty for investors by ensuring 
collectability and providing an incentive to invest in sovereign debt markets. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 26, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decided NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the most signifi-
cant decision of a nearly decade-long dispute between the hedge fund NML 
Capital, joined by other holdout creditors, and the Republic of Argentina (“Re-
public” or “Argentina”).1 The case upheld the district court’s injunctions de-
signed to remedy Argentina’s breach of its promise to pay bondholders after a 
2001 default on its sovereign debt.2 On November 21, 2012, the district court 
issued amended orders clarifying the operation of the injunctions against Ar-
gentina, and the Second Circuit subsequently affirmed the injunctions on ap-
                                                                                                                           
 * Emma Kingdon is a Managing Editor for Volume 38 of the Boston College International & 
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 1 NML Capital commenced an action in September 2006 to obtain a declaratory judgment in the 
Southern District of New York that the Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA) is the “alter 
ego” of Argentina, and therefore the BCRA’s assets held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(FRBNY) may be attachable in the execution of the judgment against the Republic. EM Ltd. v. Argen-
tina, 720 F.Supp.2d 273, 277, 299–301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. NML Capital Ltd. v. Banco 
Central de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 2 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina (NML I), 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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peal in August 2013.3 Criticizing the judgment, Argentina’s president called 
the hedge funds “vultures.”4 
Part I of this Comment discusses the debt Argentina issued, the restructur-
ings that led to the lawsuits, the district court injunctions, and the subsequent 
appeals entered by the Republic. Part II discusses the traditional remedies for 
sovereign default under legal precedent and discusses the structures for enforc-
ing sovereign debt. Part III argues that consistent with current legal precedent, 
the Second Circuit’s decision correctly implemented an injunctive remedy. 
This holding will provide security to future creditors by ensuring recovery 
against defaulted sovereign nations of the full amount of their bonds, rather 
than allow sovereign debts to opportunistically default. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Argentina’s Debt Under the FAA and Subsequent Restructurings 
In 1994, Argentina began issuing debt securities according to a Fiscal 
Agency Agreement (“FAA Bonds”) that NML Capital and other holdout credi-
tors purchased starting in December 1998.5 The FAA contains provisions to 
protect purchasers of the FAA Bonds from subordination.6 Principal among 
these provisions is the Pari Passu Clause, a so-called “Equal Treatment” pro-
vision which requires that the payments on the FAA Bonds must always rank 
at least equally with all other present and future unsubordinated debts.7 The 
FAA also included a provision that required Argentina to pay all unpaid inter-
est and principal in full in the event of a default.8 In 2001, however, Argentina 
defaulted on the FAA Bonds and its president issued a “temporary moratori-
um” on principal and interest payments on its debt, including the FAA Bonds.9 
The Argentinian president has renewed this temporary moratorium every year 
since 2001.10 
In 2005, Argentina offered creditors new exchange bonds (“Exchange 
Bonds”) to replace the FAA bonds.11 These Exchange Bonds provided Argen-
tina with 70 percent debt relief.12 To encourage bondholders to participate in 
                                                                                                                           
 3 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina (NML II), 727 F.3d 230, 237–38 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 4 Peter Eavis, Hedge Funds Win Ruling in Argentina Bond Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/hedge-funds-win-ruling-in-argentina-bond-case/ (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2014). 
 5 NML I, 699 F.3d at 251. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 NML II, 727 F.3d at 237. 
 9 NML I, 699 F.3d at 251. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s 
Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 324 (2005). 
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the exchange offer, Argentina stated that any existing defaulted bonds that 
were eligible for exchange but were not restructured would remain in default 
indefinitely, as the Argentine government had no intention of resuming pay-
ments on those bonds.13 The Argentine Legislature also passed the “Lock Law” 
which prohibited any type of in-court, out-of-court, or private settlement re-
garding the bonds, and ensured that a bondholder could not seek a remedy at 
law against the Republic.14 In 2010, Argentina temporarily suspended the Lock 
Law in order to initiate a second exchange offering that was identical to the 
2005 offering, including reaffirmation that non-restructured bonds would re-
main in default indefinitely.15 Argentina restructured 91 percent of its defaulted 
debt after the two exchange offers.16 The Argentine government continued to 
make payments on the Exchange Bonds while failing to make any payments 
on the defaulted FAA Bonds.17 
B. The District Court’s Injunctions and Argentina’s Appeal 
NML Capital and the other holdout creditors filed suit seeking injunctive 
relief against Argentina over the defaulted FAA Bonds at various points from 
2009 to 2011.18 Under the Equal Treatment provision in the FAA, Argentina is 
required to rank the payment obligation for the FAA Bonds equally with that of 
other debt.19 The Southern District of New York granted NML Capital’s mo-
tion for summary judgment and held that by lowering the rank of its bonds, 
Argentina violated the Equal Treatment provision in two ways: (1) “when it 
made payments currently due under the Exchange Bonds, while persisting in 
its refusal to satisfy its payment obligations currently due under [plaintiffs’] 
Bonds” and (2) “when it enacted [the Lock Law] and [the Lock Law Suspen-
sion].”20 
The district court granted injunctions providing that whenever Argentina 
pays any amount due on the Exchange Bonds, it must also pay NML Capital a 
“ratable payment.”21 The court reasoned that an injunction was necessary be-
cause Argentina’s clear intention to disobey any money judgment rendered any 
other legal remedy inadequate.22 The court further observed that the injunc-
tions merely required that Argentina respect the commitments it made when it 
                                                                                                                           
 13 NML I, 699 F.3d at 252. 
 14 See id. at 252. 
 15 Id. at 252–53. 
 16 Id. at 253. 
 17 Id. at 251. 
 18 Id. at 253. 
 19 Id. at 259. 
 20 Id. at 254. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 255. 
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encouraged NML Capital and the other creditors to purchase the FAA Bonds.23 
The court determined that the injunctions both ensured that Argentina would 
honor its legal obligations and served the public interest because otherwise 
creditors of a sovereign state have no other recourse through which to protect 
their interests.24 
At the appeals stage, Argentina put forth a number of reasons why the dis-
trict court erred.25 On October 26, 2012, the Second Circuit rejected Argentina’s 
arguments and affirmed the district court’s holding.26 The court remanded the 
case back to the district court, however, to clarify the implementation of the in-
junctions, particularly their application to third parties and intermediary banks.27 
C. The Amended Injunctions and Argentina’s Challenge 
On November 21, 2012, the district court issued amended injunctions and 
the case returned to the Second Circuit to determine whether the clarifications 
were reasonable.28 In the amended injunctions, the district court clarified that 
the “ratable payment” required Argentina to pay NML Capital the same per-
centage of the debt from the FAA Bonds as it pays to the Exchange Bondhold-
ers for the debt from the Exchange Bonds.29 The court also explained that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) bound “agents” and “other persons who are 
in active concert or participation” with Argentina, and thereby prevents third 
parties from circumventing the injunctions for Argentina.30 
On August 23, 2013, the Second Circuit rejected Argentina’s arguments 
against the amended injunctions and affirmed the orders.31 Ultimately, the 
court calculated that NML Capital’s unpaid principal and prejudgment interest 
amounted to approximately $1.33 billion, and must be received in full when 
Argentina pays an installment of interest on its subsequently issued debt.32 The 
enforcement of the amended injunctions was stayed, however, pending the res-
olution of a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.33 The Su-
preme Court declined to hear Argentina’s appeal on October 7, 2013.34 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. at 256. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 256–57. 
 26 Id. at 246, 265. 
 27 Id. at 265. 
 28 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina (NML II), 727 F.3d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 29 Id. at 238. 
 30 Id. at 239. 
 31 Id. at 230, 248. 
 32 Id. at 239. 
 33 Id. at 248. 
 34 Adam Liptak, Top Court Will Not Hear Argentina Debt Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/top-court-will-not-hear-argentina-debt-case/?_r=0. 
34 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
D. Types of Payment Structures for Sovereign Debt 
An important consideration regarding the enforcement of a monetary 
judgment against a sovereign debtor is whether the debtor has chosen a fiscal 
agent or a trust indenture to pay its creditors.35 Under customary financial 
practices, the distinction between the two structures is crucial.36 The type of 
payment structure determines whether or not the funds may be attached to en-
force a remedy.37 
Under a fiscal agent agreement, a sovereign appoints a fiscal agent to 
handle its fiscal matters, and thus is a representative of the debtor.38 Funds held 
by a fiscal agent remain funds of the sovereign until they are deposited into the 
creditor’s accounts.39 Under a trust indenture, a trustee is appointed as a fidu-
ciary agent to manage the matters of the issuance and thus represents the 
bondholders.40 Payments held by a trustee cannot be attached once deposited 
into the trustee’s account because the trustee serves the bondholders.41 Once 
the funds are transferred from the sovereign to the trustee, the funds are no 
longer in the sovereign’s possession and thus are outside the scope of a judg-
ment against the sovereign.42 A trust indenture, therefore, reduces the incentive 
to pursue holdout litigation against defaulted sovereigns by limiting the funds 
available to execute a monetary judgment.43 In the instant case, to pay interest 
on the Exchange Bonds, Argentina strategically appointed a trust indenture to 
transfer funds to the Exchange Bondholders.44 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Remedies for Sovereign Default under International Legal Precedent 
Sovereigns needing debt relief typically followed one of two paths: (1) 
the negotiated route, in which governments agreed on a debt restructuring deal 
with a representative committee of bondholders; or (2) a unilateral exchange 
offer, in which a settlement was presented to all bondholder creditors on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.45 Argentina followed neither path.46 Instead, Argentina 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant 
Strategy But an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 41 (2011). 
 36 Id. at 42. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id. at 41. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. at 42. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sover-
eign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1105 (2004). 
 44 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina (NML II), 727 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 45 Porzecanski, supra note 12, at 323. 
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issued an unprecedented unilateral exchange offer that provided the govern-
ment with only 70 percent debt relief and lacked many incentive provisions 
common in restructurings.47 Furthermore, to ensure the clear message that this 
offer was the bondholders’ only option, despite these unfavorable terms, the 
government passed the “Lock Law.”48 
Litigation is a straightforward remedy for sovereign default.49 A landmark 
decision in sovereign debt litigation, the Elliott case50 not only established 
breaches of the Equal Treatment provision as grounds for bringing an action 
against a sovereign but also established the appropriate remedy.51 In that case, 
Elliott Associates, a hedge fund, brought an action in the Southern District of 
New York to enforce the debt it purchased from Peru in 1983.52 Holding in 
Elliott Associates’ favor, the district court issued a judgment against Peru for 
over $55 million.53 The judgment carried little value, however, because the 
hedge fund could not identify any property or assets within the jurisdiction to 
attach in order to execute the remedy.54 
Elliott Associates subsequently brought suit against Peru in Brussels, the 
location of Peru’s clearinghouse, for violation of the Equal Treatment provi-
sion.55 In order to enforce the judgment against Peru, Elliott Associates sought 
to attach Peru’s funds that were scheduled to pay interest on its restructured 
bonds.56 Peru attempted to avoid the attachment by transferring the funds to a 
fiscal agent.57 Elliott Associates, however, argued to the court that a fiscal 
agent is Peru’s agent; therefore the funds remained the property of Peru and 
could be attached to the money judgment.58 Elliott Associates successfully ob-
tained a restraining order from the Brussels Court of Appeal that prohibited 
Peru’s fiscal agent and clearinghouse in Brussels from paying interest on the 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 323–24. 
 47 Id. at 324–25 (arguing that the transaction was unparalleled because it did not recognize inter-
est arrears nor treat them preferentially, as was the custom; it failed to include an upfront payment to 
clear a portion of the arrears, a common incentive to ensure success; it was not accompanied by an 
endorsement from the IMF or other multilateral agencies; and it did not aim for 100 percent participa-
tion, but expressed only a need of fifty percent to cure the country’s default). 
 48 See id. at 325–26. 
 49 Olivares-Caminal, supra note 35, at 40. 
 50 Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000, General Dock-
et No. 2000/QR/92, P8 (Belg.), construed in Olivares-Caminal, supra note 35, at 43. 
 51 See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 35, at 43. 
 52 William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 823, 823 (2004). 
 53 See id. at 824. 
 54 See id.; Olivares-Caminal, supra note 35, at 43. 
 55 Bratton, supra note 52, at 824. 
 56 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 43, at 1106. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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restructured bonds.59 In order to avoid defaulting on its restructured bonds, 
Peru was forced to reach an agreement to settle Elliott Associates’ claim 
through a payment of $58.45 million.60 Thus, the Elliott case illustrates that 
transferring funds to a fiscal agent is not sufficient to avoid execution of a 
monetary judgment.61 
Hedge funds repeated the tactic from the Elliott case successfully, but it 
produced mixed results and courts did not always issue the injunctive reme-
dy.62 Kensington International Ltd. brought an action against the Congo seek-
ing injunctive relief to remedy the Congo’s failure to abide by its obligation 
under an Equal Treatment provision.63 The Court of Appeal refused to grant 
the injunction because Kensington sought to enjoin assets in England and 
Wales operated by third parties.64 The court determined that these were not 
available assets of the Congo that the court could appropriately enjoin.65 The 
court reasoned that an injunction would likely disrupt arrangements that the 
Congo had already made to pay creditors and would interfere with transactions 
outside the jurisdiction of the court by coercing third parties; therefore, it was 
an inappropriate remedy.66 
The district court, using similar reasoning as applied in the Elliott case, 
granted NML Capital injunctive relief against Argentina over the defaulted 
FAA Bonds.67 In March 2012, Argentina appealed the injunctions and ad-
vanced a number of reasons why the district court erred and the injunctions 
were an inappropriate remedy.68 First, Argentina contended that NML Capital 
and the other holdout creditors were limited to the remedy of acceleration, the 
remedy contractually agreed upon in the FAA.69 Second, Argentina argued that 
compliance with the injunctions violated the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA) because it would deprive the Republic of control over its proper-
ty.70 Third, Argentina claimed that the assets were not the property of the Re-
public because they were deposited into a trust indenture for the bondholders 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 35, at 43. 
 60 Id. at 44–45. 
 61 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 43, at 1105–06. 
 62 See Bratton, supra note 52, at 824. 
 63 Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo (Kensington I), 2003 WL 1935493 ¶¶ 2–3 (C.A. 
May 13, 2003). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. ¶¶ 4, 7 (quoting Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo, 2002 No. 1088 (Commer-
cial Ct. Apr. 16, 2003)). 
 66 Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo, 2002 No. 1088 (Commercial 
Ct. Apr. 16, 2003)). 
 67 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina (NML I), 699 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 68 Id. at 256. 
 69 Id. at 257. 
 70 Id. 
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and therefore could not be attached.71 Fourth, Argentina argued that because 
the harm to the creditors was monetary, the district court erred by concluding 
that the harm was irreparable.72 Fifth, Argentina contended that the injunctions 
ran counter to the public interest because they would plunge the Republic into 
a new financial and economic crisis.73 Finally, Argentina argued that this deci-
sion would have far-reaching implications for other sovereign nations issuing 
debt because it enables “a single creditor to thwart the implementation of an 
internationally supported restructuring plan” on other sovereign nations issuing 
debt.74 
The Second Circuit affirmed the holding, agreeing with the district court’s 
determination that Argentina breached the Equal Treatment provision and this 
entitled NML Capital to injunctive relief.75 The court dismissed Argentina’s 
claim that acceleration was the contractually agreed upon remedy in the FAA, 
as no clause in the FAA limited the remedies available for a breach of the 
agreement.76 Therefore, the court found that other appropriate remedies, in-
cluding injunctive relief, could be implemented.77 Furthermore, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the injunctions did not deprive Argentina of control of 
its property, as they did not attach, arrest or execute upon any property, but 
rather, allowed Argentina to pay its debts with any source it chose.78 The dis-
trict court found that the Republic could pay NML Capital the amount of the 
judgment; therefore the Second Circuit did not find support for Argentina’s 
claim that the injunctions would force the sovereign into a new financial cri-
sis.79 Finally, the court determined it was unlikely that future sovereigns would 
be in the same position as Argentina because collective action clauses, which 
eliminate the possibility of sovereign debt litigation, were included in 99 per-
cent of the bonds issued since 2005, including Argentina’s restructured 
bonds.80 
B. Enforcing Judgments Against Sovereign Debtors 
To pay interest to its Exchange Bondholders, Argentina transferred funds 
to an indenture trustee, Bank of New York Mellon (“BNY”).81 BNY forwarded 
the funds to the registered owner of the Exchange Bonds, who then transferred 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. at 263–64. 
 75 Id. at 250, 261. 
 76 Id. at 262. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 263. 
 80 Id. at 264. 
 81 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina (NML II), 727 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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the funds to a clearinghouse.82 The clearinghouse subsequently deposited the 
funds into financial institutions that conveyed the funds to the Exchange 
Bondholders.83 Rule 65(d) binds “agents” and “other persons who are in active 
concert or participation” with an enjoined party.84 Therefore, in its amended 
orders, the court clarified that the injunctions applied to Argentina, and through 
the operation of Rule 65(d), also bind the indenture trustee(s), the registered 
owners, and the clearinghouse.85 These parties are entities involved in the sys-
tem through which Argentina pays Exchange Bondholders; therefore, they 
could assist Argentina in evading the injunctions.86 
To challenge the amended injunctions, Argentina advanced a list of rea-
sons why the amended injunctions unjustly injured itself, the Exchange Bond-
holders, and the public.87 First, Argentina argued that the amended injunctions 
forced it to use resources protected by the FSIA.88 Second, Argentina claimed 
that the ratable payment remedy was inequitable because it resulted in holdout 
creditors receiving their full principal and all accrued interest while the Ex-
change Bondholders only received a single installment of interest on their 
bonds.89 Third, Argentina argued that the amended injunctions caused unrea-
sonable hardship to Exchange Bondholders.90 As the Argentine government 
had made it clear that it would not pay the holdout creditors, neither NML 
Capital nor the Exchange Bondholders would be paid if the injunctions were 
enforced.91 Finally, Argentina claimed the injunctions were injurious to the 
public interest because their enforcement would have serious repercussions in 
the capital markets and the global economy.92 
Argentina, BNY, and a few Exchange Bondholders also advanced argu-
ments as to how the injunctions injure participants in the Exchange Bond pay-
ment system.93 First, BNY and an Exchange Bondholder argued that the dis-
trict court lacked personal jurisdiction over payment system participants, and 
therefore, could not enjoin them through the amended injunctions.94 Second, 
the Exchange Bondholders argued that the amended injunctions were improper 
because they could not extraterritorially enjoin the payment systems that deliv-
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 240. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 241. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 242. 
 92 Id. at 246. 
 93 Id. at 242. 
 94 Id. at 242–43. 
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er funds.95 Finally, Argentina and the Exchange Bondholders argued that the 
amended injunctions violated Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
which establishes the framework of the rights and obligations governing wire 
transfers, because the injunctions bind parties acting as intermediary banks.96 
Argentina claimed that two sections were at issue: § 502, which defines credi-
tor process and bars suits against creditors in the context of electronic fund 
transfer except against the beneficiary’s bank; and § 503, which requires 
“proper cause” before a party to a fund transfer may be enjoined.97 The Repub-
lic argued that the district court avoided § 502’s ban because the amended in-
junctions affect multiple banks and lacked the proper cause required under 
§ 503 to enjoin any of parties to transfers not involving Argentina.98 
The Second Circuit affirmed the amended injunctions and determined that 
none of Argentina’s arguments regarding the injuries to the participants in the 
Exchange Bond payment system had merit.99 The court dismissed the argu-
ment that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction, as the injunctions were 
only issued against Argentina.100 Although the injunctions automatically apply 
to those who participate with the enjoined party under Rule 65(d), the rule 
merely acted as notice to payment system participants that they could become 
liable.101 Therefore, it was irrelevant whether the district court had personal 
jurisdiction over the other participants, as they were not directly enjoined.102 
The Second Circuit also concluded that because it was necessary that the pro-
cess to pay Exchange Bondholders was covered by the injunctions in order to 
prevent Argentina from avoiding its obligations to NML Capital, the district 
court had sufficient reasons to bind Argentina’s conduct, regardless of whether 
that conduct occurred in the United States or abroad.103 Furthermore, the court 
determined that § 502 did not apply because the injunctions do not fall within 
the definition of creditor process.104 Finally, the Second Circuit found that the 
district court satisfied the “proper cause” requirement of § 503 because injunc-
tions would be ineffective at holding Argentina accountable if they did not 
cover Argentina as well as the Exchange Bond payment system.105 In accord-
ance with § 503’s ban on injunctions against intermediary banks, the district 
court excluded intermediary banks from the scope of the amended injunctions, 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. at 243. 
 96 Id. at 244 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 244–45. 
 99 Id. at 242–43. 
 100 Id. at 243. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 243–44. 
 104 Id. at 244. 
 105 Id. at 244, 245. 
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but correctly included BNY, the registered owners, and the clearing system 
within the scope of the injunctions because they did not function as intermedi-
ary banks.106 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Second Circuit was correct in granting injunctive relief to enforce the 
monetary judgment and in validating litigation consistent with the Elliott case to 
resolve sovereign default cases.107 The proliferation of injunctive remedies has 
become a way to give creditors the certainty and security they seek when invest-
ing abroad.108 Prior solutions for resolving claims with sovereigns needing debt 
relief created uncertainty for investors because they did not have enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure the creditors’ recovery rights.109 Therefore, the injunctive 
remedy is the most predictable remedy and best promotes investment.110 
Ultimately, in the instant case, NML Capital’s expectations about recover-
ing its investment after Argentina’s default were based on the Elliott case.111 
Prior to this case, trust indentures were typically exempt from attachment be-
cause they were considered a distinct entity independent from the sovereign 
that holds the funds on behalf of the bondholders.112 While the use of the trust 
indenture initially worked in the sovereign debtor’s favor by limiting the funds 
available to satisfy judgments and thus deterred litigation, the extension of 
Rule 65(d) in this case now enables holdout creditors to pursue litigation by 
making those funds available for attachment.113 By applying the injunction to 
the indenture trustees, the registered owners, and the clearinghouse to enforce 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id. at 245. 
 107 See id. at 248; Olivares-Caminal, supra note 35, at 41. 
 108 Porzecanski, supra note 12, at 327 (arguing that international pressure through litigation is the 
only way to motivate a sovereign debtor to meet its obligations to its creditors in a fair and responsible 
manner). 
 109 Id. at 315, 327 (arguing that reforms should be aimed at facilitating the enforcement of claims 
against sovereigns as seeking a remedy in courts against a sovereign had been a fruitless endeavor); 
see also Fisch & Gentile, supra note 43, at 1044 (arguing that because countries are not subject to a 
standardized process of reorganization upon default, the process of negotiations between the sovereign 
debtor and its creditors allows a sovereign to opportunistically default rather than make the necessary 
sacrifices to make payments, to create unreasonable restructuring terms, to discriminate against minor-
ity creditors, and to allow political factors to influence the restructuring process). 
 110 See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 43, at 1086–87 (arguing that the District Court for the District 
of Columbia in Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia acknowledged the importance of the policy considera-
tions adopted in the New York courts’ acceptance of litigation to enforce sovereign debt because it 
reduces the nonpayment risk associated with investment in sovereign debt); Olivares-Caminal, supra 
note 35, at 41. 
 111 See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 35, at 60. 
 112 See id. at 42. 
 113 See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 43, at 1105. 
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the monetary judgment, the Second Circuit promoted certainty and security for 
investors in Argentina like NML Capital.114 
The Second Circuit’s decision to extend Rule 65(d) to bind trust indentures 
was necessary because the current legal remedies for bondholders against sover-
eign debtors were not working.115 Throughout the rapid globalization of stock, 
bond, and currency markets, parties investing in sovereign debt increasingly 
sought reforms to facilitate the enforcement of claims against sovereigns.116 
Many creditors had unsuccessfully sought to recover their funds from sovereign 
debtors who take advantage of their de facto immunity by entering into litiga-
tion.117 By including an injunctive remedy, the Second Circuit’s decision should 
increase the recovery rate of creditors against rogue sovereign debtors because 
the injunctions ensure that monetary judgments are enforced.118 
Leading scholars of corporate, securities, and financial law highlight sev-
eral reasons why litigation by holdout creditors like NML Capital improves the 
debt market.119 First, it serves as a check on opportunistic defaults and unrea-
sonable restructuring terms.120 Second, it benefits the restructuring process by 
empowering creditors, particularly minority creditors, and limits complicity 
among the majority of the creditors.121 Finally, litigation and injunctive relief 
against rogue debtors promotes the functioning of international capital markets 
by increasing capital flows to sovereign debtors and increasing liquidity in the 
sovereign debt market.122 
Economists have also expressed concern about the deleterious effects of 
rogue debtors.123 One observer noted in the instant case where the unilateral 
restructuring called for 70 percent relief on debt, that “Argentina’s demand for 
such massive debt relief was without precedent in its own checkered financial 
history.”124 Pressure needs to be placed on the sovereign debtor to persuade it 
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not to walk away from its lawful obligations.125 Litigation provides the neces-
sary pressure and the injunctive relief provides additional security whereby 
creditors feel confident to invest.126 
Increased judicial intervention, however, has sparked debates against 
holdout creditors and against litigation for resolving sovereign default.127 Crit-
ics argue that litigation creates disruption in the restructuring process, length-
ens the time needed to complete the restructuring, and increases costs, which 
results in less money to pay creditors.128 Furthermore, the potential for holdout 
litigation discourages sovereign debtors and other creditors from even entering 
the restructuring process.129 Therefore, according to critics, litigation from 
holdout creditors brings instability and vulnerability to the sovereign debt 
market and serves to chill investment because it disadvantages other creditors 
and harms sovereign debtors.130 
These arguments do not recognize that litigation restricts a rogue sover-
eign debtor’s ability to delay restructurings and enables minority creditors to 
challenge the terms of restructurings that only benefit majority creditors.131 
Without the injunctive remedy, litigation was previously unsuccessful in deter-
ring rogue debtors.132 After Argentina’s default in 2001, but prior to the re-
structuring, nearly forty individual lawsuits and more than a dozen class action 
lawsuits were filed in the United States seeking repayment of Argentina’s obli-
gation.133 In Italy, half a dozen bondholders brought legal proceedings against 
Argentina and similarly in Germany more than 100 additional claimants com-
menced such actions.134 Any holdings in the creditors’ favor would not have 
any value without an injunction if no property could be attached to the judg-
ments.135 Thus, by issuing injunctive relief, the court established itself as an 
authority to stop rogue debtors from opportunistic defaults and to bring cer-
tainty to the sovereign debt market by enforcing monetary judgments.136 
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The injunctions at issue in NML Capital best encourage investment by en-
suring recovery for creditors.137 Injunctive relief that binds financial agents of 
sovereigns from making payments on restructured debt creates the incentive 
for sovereign debtors to meet the terms of their obligations to their creditors.138 
In the original bond, Argentina promised that, in the event of default, unpaid 
interest, and principal would be due in full.139 To that end, the court noted that 
it is equitable for a creditor to receive what it bargained for; therefore, the 
holding only requires Argentina to meet its contractual obligation.140 Further-
more, the injunctive remedy provides an authority measure over disputes be-
tween creditors and sovereign debtors where the government debt market lacks 
such a body.141 Unlike in the private market where there are bankruptcy 
measures, a country cannot be subject to liquidation or standardized processes 
of reorganization.142 Thus, the injunction improves the sovereign debt market 
by ensuring that a sovereign pays its debts and does not place itself “above the 
law.”143 
CONCLUSION 
In the sovereign debt market, the typical remedies to resolve sovereign 
default include either the negotiation route or a unilateral exchange offer. As a 
result of increasing insecurity in the sovereign debt market due to rogue sover-
eign debtors who take advantage of their immunity to opportunistically default 
and create unfavorable restructuring deals, creditors began resorting to a previ-
ously limited remedy. Although litigation to resolve sovereign default was not 
a new concept in the sovereign debt market because it brought predictability to 
the debt market by ensuring recovery to creditors, it was ineffective due to the 
creditor’s inability to actually recover the money judgment from the sovereign 
debtor. Without a binding injunction on a sovereign’s financial agents, litiga-
tion to recover a money judgment was a fruitless endeavor because there was 
rarely any sovereign property to attach to the judgment. In NML Capital, the 
Second Circuit determined that the injunctive remedy was necessary to moti-
vate sovereign debtors to meet the obligations to their creditors and to reduce 
the nonpayment risk in the sovereign debt market. By establishing an enforce-
ment mechanism for a creditor against a sovereign debtor, the Second Circuit 
followed similar reasoning as the Elliott case and avoided creating additional 
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uncertainty from issued money judgments that could not be collected due to 
sovereign immunity. Such an approach for future courts resolving sovereign 
debt cases would further increase certainty for investors by ensuring collecta-
bility and provide an incentive to invest in sovereign debt markets. 
